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Abstract 
 We consider public-private partnerships, in which a public official selects a 
project that is then developed and operated by a private contractor. We derive optimal 
public accounting rules when the official's choice among projects is biased by ideology or 
social ties or because of pandering to special interests. We give particular emphasis to 
how the rules should constrain the official’s incentive to understate the costs of her pet 
projects. 
 In the basic model, we show that the optimal accounting rule takes the form of a 
budget cap, with a project’s expected cost modified to reflect the official’s distortionary 
incentives. If the project can be partially financed privately, then “fixed-price” contracts 
can serve to curb political misbehavior by “securitizing” public sector liabilities. 
 We also consider the possibility that development and operations are each 
handled by different contractors. Such “unbundling” deprives public accountants of 
forward information about future costs, but can prevent the official from funneling 
hidden future rents to contractors. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Public procurement accounts for a sizeable share of economic activity in most 
countries.  Thus, how to deliver high-quality public services at low cost to the taxpayer 
and user is an important problem.  An interesting recent development in the effort to find 
solutions is the growth of public-private partnerships (PPPs), both in industrialized 
countries (e.g., the United Kingdom, as in its Private Finance Initiative launched in 1992) 
and in emerging economies (e.g., Latin America, Eastern Europe, and China during the 
1990s).  PPPs have been created for large-scale projects in transportation (rail systems, 
highways, subways), medical care, telecommunications, energy, water systems, and even 
orphan drugs. 
Although the variety of risk-sharing arrangements and governance structures 
makes a precise characterization difficult, a PPP is usually defined as a long-term 
development and service contract between government and a private partner.  The 
government typically engages its partner both to develop the project and to operate and 
service it.  The partner may bear substantial risk and even raise private finance.  Its 
revenue derives from some combination of government payments and user fees. 
 In comparing PPPs to more traditional procurement (in which project 
development on the one hand and operations and maintenance on the other are generally 
arranged under separate contracts), the literature has generally focused on the incentives 
of the private partner.  For example, one much-discussed potential advantage of PPPs is 
that, by “bundling” construction and operations, they induce the developer to internalize 
cost reductions at the operations stage that are brought about by investment at the 
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development stage.1  But, by the same token, bundling may lead to a loss in operational 
efficiency because the best developer might not also be the best operator.2  Moreover, it 
may encourage choices that reduce future costs at the expense of service quality. 3,4 
 The literature’s focus on the private agent is understandable in view of the 
standard presumption in academic and policy work on public procurement that the 
government acts to maximize social welfare.  Assuming governmental benevolence is a 
reasonable first step in the analysis of PPPs, but, of course, over-simplifies reality.  
Accordingly, a fair number of recent studies have departed from the benevolence 
assumption by supposing that the private partner or other parties may capture the 
procurement process by side-contracting (colluding) with the government.5 
 In this paper we consider a less-explored reason for why procurement projects 
may not align with the public’s best interest: government officials may have preferences 
that differ from those of a social welfare maximizer.  More specifically, ideology, social 
or political ties, or the incentive to pander may induce an official to favor the pet projects 
of particular interest groups—i.e., to practice “pork-barrel” politics—even though these 
                                                 
1 Sometimes such internalization can be achieved without bundling if the project developer can be made 
fully accountable for the profits of the operator who succeeds him, as in case of second-sourcing (Iossa-
Legros 2004).  However, internalization may well be imperfect, either because of developer risk aversion 
(Martimort-Pouyet 2005) or because of collusion between the operator and its regulator, who can together 
manipulate accounts to the detriment of the developer (Laffont-Tirole 1988 and Stein 1989). 
2 Laffont-Tirole (1988) 
3 Hart (2003), Bennett-Iossa (2004), and Martimort-Pouyet (2005).  The latter allow for quality incentives 
as well as observable costs. 
4 Because of their complexity, PPPs may also be costly to negotiate; see Välilä (2005, section 5) 
5 E.g., Grossman-Helpman (1994), Laffont-Martimort (1999), Laffont-Tirole (1991), and Martimort (1999).  
The literature includes two results on the increased scope for capture under PPP contracts: Martimort-
Pouyet (2005) show that separate contracts tend to entail lower-powered incentives and therefore make 
capture more difficult then under bundling.  Laffont-Tirole (1993, chapter 16) argue that separate contracts 
may be optimal despite the potential efficiency gains from bundling, because a future government (which 
itself may be corruptible) may undo collusion if not bound by a long-term contract signed by its 
predecessor. 
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projects may not be justifiable from the standpoint of social welfare.  We are particularly 
interested in how spending caps can mitigate the official’s biases. 
There is substantial evidence that politicians’ project choices are influenced 
significantly by the desire to please constituencies and by budgetary constraints.  Levin-
Tadelis (2006) document that local political institutions in the U.S. have a profound 
impact on such choices.  Less formal evidence in France suggests that efficiency 
considerations in the production of public goods are often secondary to the government’s 
determination to deliver visible private benefits to particular interest groups, with costs 
hidden or delayed as much as possible.  For that matter, the very fact that governments in 
many countries are made to face budgetary constraints at all would be quite mysterious if 
their goal were truly to maximize social welfare. 
Indeed, the marked increase in PPP contracts worldwide is often attributed less to 
the intrinsic qualities of such contracts than to governments’ attempts to evade budget 
constraints by taking liabilities off the balance sheet.6  For this reason, some 
commentators worry that accounting gimmickry may become the primary motive behind 
PPPs, so that “governments may not take the care to properly design contracts to ensure 
that appropriate incentives are in place” (Mintz-Smart 2005, page 17; see also IMF 2005, 
p. 27).7 
                                                 
6 Traditionally, many countries often record PPPs off the public sector’s balance sheet.  Indeed, PPP 
financing is often provided via “special purpose vehicles” involving banks and other financial institutions, 
which can be used as a private veil to hide explicit or implicit government guarantees. To combat this 
tendency, Eurostat (2000) requires that PPPs be recorded on the public balance sheet unless the private 
partner carries the construction risk and either the availability or demand risk. 
7 Interestingly, PPPs are sometimes actually justified on the grounds that they alleviate government budgets 
and substitute cheap private funding for discretionary finance.  Engel et al  (2006) show that this argument 
is highly suspect, as the future user revenue lost by ceding income flows to the private sector exactly offsets 
the investment savings made by the government early on in the relationship.  See Bassetto-Sargent (2005), 
Beetsman-Uhlig (1999), Blanchard-Giavazzi (2004), Calmfors (2005), Inman and Rubinfeld (1997), Koen-
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 Our paper builds on Maskin-Tirole (2004 and 2007) to examine PPPs as 
instruments in pork-barrel politics.  To keep the analysis simple, we limit our focus to the 
constraining role of public accounting systems, and, unlike our earlier papers, ignore the 
restraints imposed by electoral accountability.8  However, as explained in section 3 (see 
footnote 16), the most straightforward way of incorporating accountability in our model 
changes none of our qualitative conclusions. We lay out our benchmark model in section 
2.   A public official is in charge of choosing projects and a contractor of carrying them 
out.  Each project comprises two stages, with a commonly known first-period cost and an 
(a priori) uncertain second-period cost (which can be high or low). In the benchmark 
model, the two stages are “bundled”: the same contractor is there for both periods.  The 
public official and her contractor have the same information about the project’s second 
period cost: with probability x, they learn (privately) the magnitude of this cost (i.e., 
whether it is high or low); with probability 1 – x, they, like the public, remain uninformed. 
There is a continuum of interest groups, and the public official “favors” a fraction 
of them in the sense that she prefers a project she knows is high-cost and that benefits a 
favored group to one that benefits some unfavored group and whose cost is not yet 
known.  This preference give rise to the central inefficiency of the model: the official has 
the incentive to "pass off" high-cost projects she favors as projects with still unknown 
costs. 
In section 3, we study PPPs when contractors are “cashless,” i.e., they can bear no 
risk in their costs.  This set up is particularly simple, as we can focus without loss of 
                                                                                                                                                 
van den Noord (2005), and Milesi-Ferretti (2000) for further discussion of the proper control of public 
deficits and borrowing. 
8 Two other papers that examine public spending and electoral accountability are Canes-Wrone et al (2001) 
and Dewatripont-Seabright (2005).   
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generality on just fixed-price contracts (which can be used for projects with known costs) 
and cost-plus contracts (appropriate for projects with unknown costs). 9  The public 
official can pass off a favored high-cost project as one with unknown cost by awarding 
the contractor a cost-plus contract.  That is, cost-plus contracts are vulnerable to adverse 
selection: the official will use them not only for the projects for which they were 
designed (those with unknown costs), but also for her inefficient pet projects.10 We show 
that the public official can be induced to behave more in line with social welfare if 
subjected to a spending limit and a public accounting system.  Moreover, the public 
accounting system can be chosen to be "linear," and we derive its optimal form. The 
accounting costs will, in general, differ from true costs to reflect the adverse selection 
problem described above. 
The optimal accounting system induces a public spending rule that takes one of 
two forms.  Either it is “tight,” so that only favored projects of uncertain cost and projects 
known to be low-cost are undertaken.  Or else it is “lax,” in which case all projects are 
undertaken except those that are high cost and do not benefit a favored group.  Ceteris 
paribus, lax spending limits will pertain when the fraction of interest groups that are 
favored is small and the probability x that the public official learns the second period cost 
is low.  
In section 4, we allow contractors to be privately financed, a possibility that can 
raise welfare.  Private finance allows cost-plus PPP arrangements to be replaced by more 
                                                 
9 In our model, in which contractors do not exert effort toward cost reduction, cost-plus contracts do as well 
as fixed-price contracts for projects with known costs. However, introducing costly effort would make 
fixed-price contracts strictly dominant. 
10  Clearly, this logic extends well beyond the context of this particular model.  For example, it would also 
hold in a Laffont-Tirole (1986) procurement model, generating a menu of incentive schemes with different 
cost-sharing coefficients. 
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efficient fixed-price contracts; hence, the theory predicts that private finance will be 
associated with a higher use of fixed-price contracts. Intuitively, private finance shifts 
risk to the private sector and attenuates (indeed—in our simple model—altogether 
eliminates) the adverse selection problem. It thereby enables the “securitization” of 
public sector liabilities. 
In sections 5 and 6, we compare PPPs with the more conventional arrangement in 
which development and operations are “unbundled,” i.e., there is a separate contractor for 
each.  We show that PPPs offer the potential advantage that projects’ true costs can be 
assessed earlier, making it hard for the official to push through her favorite project.  
However, PPPs also introduce the countervailing danger that contractors may be able to 
mask high costs by accepting low initial payments in exchange for high rents later on.  
Specifically, if the contractor obtains second-period rents that are not observable to 
accountants at stage 1, then the contractor will be willing to undertake high-cost projects 
at an initially low-cost rate, providing extra scope for the public official to sidestep the 
financial constraints in period 1. 
Section 7 concludes by suggesting a few avenues for further work. 
 
2 Model 
There are two periods, 1,2t =  (but no discounting) and a large number of interest 
groups (technically, a continuum) indexed by [ ]0,1i∈  in the country or municipality.  At 
date 1, the public official decides, for each i, whether or not to invest in a project that 
benefits that interest group.  Each project i costs 1I  (which is deterministic) at date 1 and 
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2
iI  (which ex ante is stochastic) at date 2.  Because of 2
iI ’s randomness, the total cost 
1 2
i
iC I I= +  can assume either of two values : i LC C=  with probability ρ  and i HC C=  
with probability 1 ρ− . 
 Costs are independently distributed across interest groups and are borne equally 
by everyone (i.e., by all the interest groups).  By contrast, the benefit B from project i 
accrues only to interest group i.11  Thus if iy  denotes the decision about project i—where 
1iy =  denotes “invest in i” and 0iy =  “do not invest”—the welfare of interest group i is  
    ,i j jy B E y C⎡ ⎤− ⎣ ⎦  
where “E” denotes the expectation operator.  For each project i, there is probability x that 
the public official and the contractor (but not the public at large) learn the value of iC  in 
advance (because the project is pre-evaluated).  In that event (which is independent 
across projects), we will speak of a “ LC -project” or a “ HC project.” With probability 
1 x− , the official does not learn iC ’s value.  We will then refer to a “C -project,” where 
    ( )1L HC C Cρ ρ= + − , 
i.e., C  is the prior mean.  We assume that  
(1)    HC B C> > , 
and so if the official maximized social welfare—i.e., the expected sum of the interest 
groups’ welfare—she would undertake the LC - and C - but not the HC -projects. 
                                                 
11 The exact timing of this accrual is not crucial; for concreteness, assume that it occurs at date 2 (but is 
anticipated by the interest group at date 1). 
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 For each project i, there is a corresponding contractor,12 who has the same 
information as the official.  In line with our focus on PPPs, we shall suppose for now that 
contractor i incurs both the costs 1I  and 2
iI  (below in section 5, we will contrast this 
model with the “unbundled” case in which there are separate contractors for development 
and for service/operations).  In return, it receives payment ( )it C  as a function of its cost, 
as specified in the procurement contract. 
 We are interested in two alternative possibilities: (i) the case where the contractor 
has no cash and must receive ( )i it C C≥  for any realized iC ; and (ii) that where the 
contractor has “financial muscle,” so that it can commit to more general incentive 
contracts (this latter case includes the possibility that a contractor is initially cashless but 
can borrow from financial intermediaries). 
 We will start with case (i), which implies that because the official wishes ceteris 
paribus to minimize her payments, she will offer the contractor either a “cost-plus” 
contract, specifying ( )L Lt C C=  and ( )H Ht C C=  or a “fixed-price” contract, where 
Lt C≡  or Ht C≡ .  Note that a fixed price contract with Lt C≡  is feasible only if the 
official and contractor know that i LC C= ; otherwise the contractor cannot be sure of 
covering its costs. 
 The public official “favors” a fraction ( )0,1f ∈  of the interest groups and 
weights their welfare by 1fα > .  The remaining fraction 1 f−  consists of “unfavored” 
groups, with welfare weight 1uα < .  Without loss of generality, we assume 
                                                 
12 We assume that the contractor is a private firm, i.e., independent of the government.  It would be 
worthwhile extending the model to accommodate the trade-offs between having private and public 
contractors: in particular, public firms might face less severe cash constraints than their private counterparts 
(see below), but could give the official an additional way to channel benefits to specific interest groups. 
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that [ ] ( )1 1i f uE f fα α α= + − = , where { },i f uα α α∈  is the welfare weight on interest 
group i.  The official wishes to maximize the expected sum of weighted welfare across 
interest groups: 
(2)    ( )i i iE B C yα −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . 
To introduce (i) a potential conflict between the official’s actions and social welfare 
maximization and (ii) a tendency for the official to overspend, we assume that 
(3)    0f H uB C B Cα α− > − > , 
which implies, from (1), that the official will wish to replace a C -project benefiting an 
unfavored group with a HC -project benefiting a favored group. 
 We focus on how spending caps and accounting rules can be designed to best 
constrain the official’s deviation from the social optimum.13  A linear accounting system 
consists of a spending limit G on public expenditure and accounting costs ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,  and L HC C C , 
corresponding to low fixed-price, high fixed-price, and cost-plus contracts respectively, 
with ˆ ˆ ˆL HC C C≤ ≤ .  The official is then constrained to choose a set of contracts that 
satisfies 
(4)   ˆ ˆ ˆL L H Hn C n C nC G+ + ≤ , 
where ,L Hn n , and n  are the proportions of all potential projects corresponding to low 
fixed-price, high fixed-price, and cost-plus contracts, respectively.  We will show in 
                                                 
13 We suppose that the accounting system can be specified a priori, e.g., by a constitution.  But clearly it 
would also be of interest to examine the self-serving choices of accounting rules by politicians.  As noted 
by Mintz-Smart (2005, p.2): “In practice, governments have often initiated capital accounts to provide an 
opportunity to escape the impact of the fiscal rule.  Alternatively, they have pushed debt finance off their 
own books to quasi-public agencies not consolidated in the budget or to the private sector under public-
private partnership arrangements.”  An example of this last stratagem is Ispa, the Italian off-budget agency 
created to form PPPs and raise capital by issuing state-guaranteed bonds, so as to finance new infrastructure 
while complying with the European Stability and Growth Pact. 
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section 3 that, we can impose this linear structure without loss of generality.14  Note that 
we are implicitly assuming in (4) that all contracts are publicly observable, so that, in 
particular, the official cannot report a high fixed-price or cost-plus contract as a low 
fixed-price contract. 15 
 The reader may wonder why it is not optimal to set the accounting costs equal to 
the actual (expected) costs. The answer can be traced to the adverse-selection problem: 
the official has the incentive to hide some projects she knows to have high costs behind 
cost-plus contracts. The accounting system must recognize this tendency and attempt to 
"penalize" it; hence, the divergence between accounting and actual costs. 
 Following the political economy literature (see footnote 7), we suppose that the 
public official can be enjoined ex ante from exceeding her spending limit (say, by a court 
order), but that she cannot be punished or rewarded ex post (i.e., after costs are realized) 
for any date 1 pronouncement she makes about costs.  This assumption rules out schemes 
in which she is induced to reveal what she knows about costs at date 1 for fear of 
punishment ex post if her cost forecast deviates from realized costs. Because of the law of 
large numbers, such schemes could, in fact, generate the full social optimum in our 
continuous model with independent costs (implying that there is no aggregate 
uncertainty), since perfect forecasts would be possible.  However, in a somewhat more 
                                                 
14 Because investment is the only item on our simplified government balance sheet, we can avoid the debate 
on the relative merits of cash accounting (which charges government investment expenses to a single 
budget) and accrual accounting (with the concomitant Pigou-Keynes’ golden rule policy that capital—but 
not current—expenditures are financed through public borrowing).  Our “spending cap” can equivalently 
be interpreted as a limit on borrowing to finance public investment. 
15 To avoid the possibility that an official can arrange a low fixed-price contract for a 
H
C -project by telling 
the contractor that she will pay it more later, we suppose that any such informal arrangement is 
unenforceable. 
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elaborate model that includes aggregate cost uncertainty and sufficient risk aversion on 
the part of the official, these schemes would no longer be significantly useful. 
 
3 Optimal Accounting Systems with Cashless Contractors 
 Supposing that the contractor is cashless, we now derive the linear accounting 
system that is optimal in the sense of inducing the official to choose the set of contracts 
closest to the social optimum.  We also show that this scheme is optimal in the broader 
class of all feasible accounting schemes. 
 A benevolent official would not have to be constrained and would spend 
( )1Lx C x C Gρ + − = . Faced with budget cap G, a non-benevolent official will replace 
some medium-cost (i.e., uncertain) projects with high-cost projects for her favored groups. 
We now show that it is not optimal to use real-cost accounting and the naive cap G 
computed above.  
 We note first that, since (1) implies HC -projects are not socially desirable, we 
might as well take ˆHC = ∞ , so that the official will never undertake a HC -project under a 
fixed-price contract.  Instead, any such project will be carried out on a cost-plus basis.  Of 
course, C -projects must also be performed through cost-plus contracts.  So, in effect, the 
official is disguising high-cost projects as C -projects (the contractor obviously will not 
object to this gimmick since it fares equally well under cost-plus and high fixed-price 
contracts, and public accountants cannot prevent the gimmick since they cannot 
distinguish ex ante between HC - and C -projects). 
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 The official solves 
  ( ) ( ) ( ){max 1
{ }
Lf Lu
f L u Lx fy B C f y B C
y
ρ α α⎡ ⎤− + − −⎣ ⎦  
(5)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1Hf Huf H u Hx fy B C f y B Cρ α α⎡ ⎤+ − − + − −⎣ ⎦  
   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) }1 1f uf ux f y B C f y B Cα α⎡ ⎤+ − − + − −⎣ ⎦  
subject to 
  ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ1 1 1L f Lu Hf HuLx fy f y C x fy f y Cρ ρ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − + − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  
(6) 
   ( ) ( ) ˆ1 1 ,f ux f y f y C G⎡ ⎤+ − + − ≤⎣ ⎦  
where L fy  is the proportion of favored LC -projects that are undertaken, and 
, , ,Lu Hf Hu fy y y y , and uy  are the corresponding proportions for unfavored LC -projects, 
favored HC -projects, unfavored HC -projects, favored C -projects, and unfavored C -
projects, respectively and ( ), , , , ,L f Lu Hf Hu f uy y y y y y y= .  In view of (4) and (6) we note 
that  
( ) ) ( ) ( )(( ) ( ) ( )( )1 , 1 1 , 1 1 .L f Lu H f Hu f uL Hn x fy f y n x fy f y n x f y f yρ ρ= + − = − + − = − + −
 
 Letting μ  denote the shadow price of the budget constraint, we can characterize 
the solution by: 
(7)   ˆ1Lk k L Ly B C Cα μ= ⇔ ≥ +  
(8)   ˆ1Hk k Hy B C Cα μ= ⇔ ≥ +  
(9)   ˆ1k ky B C Cα μ= ⇔ ≥ + , 
where ,k f u= . 
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Note that, given ˆLC  and Cˆ , the choice of a spending cap G is equivalent to 
specifying a value of μ .  Moreover, there is one dimension of freedom in how 
parameters are scaled, so that the accounting costs ˆLC  and Cˆ  and the shadow price μ  
can be scaled up or down without changing the solution.  Thus, because from (3), 
0u LB Cα − >  we can assume, without loss of generality, that ˆL LC C= . 
 Because 0LB C− > , it is socially desirable that LC -projects always be chosen by 
the official.  Furthermore, this desideratum is attainable by the optimal accounting system 
since, no matter what value is chosen for ˆ ˆ,  LC Cμ  can be taken small enough so that the 
inequality in (7) holds for ,k f u= .   
 From (3), we have 
   f f H u u HB C B C B C B Cα α α α− > − > − > − . 
That is, omitting low-cost projects, the official’s ranking in order of decreasing 
preference is: (A) favored C -projects, (B) favored HC -projects, (C) unfavored C -
projects and (D) unfavored HC -projects.
16  Note that because there is no way for an 
accounting system (whether linear or not) to distinguish between C - and HC -projects, 
any such system simply induces a cut-off point: all projects above that point in the 
official’s ranking will be implemented and those below will not.  Observe, furthermore, 
that a cut-off between (B) and (C) makes no sense: if favored HC -projects (whose 
contribution to social welfare is negative) are accepted, then unfavored C -projects (with 
                                                 
16 If we added a reelection motive to the official’s objectives by supposing that a (random) fraction of the 
interest groups would vote for her provided that she invested in their projects, then this ranking would 
remain the same, and so none of our conclusions would be altered.  If, however, there were differences 
across groups in the visibility of public spending or in the elasticity of voting response to such spending, 
then electoral accountability could make a difference. 
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a positive net contribution) should be included also.  Similarly, a cut-off that either 
excludes or includes all projects cannot be optimal. 
 We conclude that the only two cut-offs that can potentially be optimal are those (i) 
between (A) and (B), and (ii) between (C) and (D).  The former corresponds to a “tight” 
spending limit—in which only favored C -projects are undertaken—and can be achieved 
through a linear accounting system by choosing μ  and Cˆ  so that  
(10)    ˆf B C Cα μ= + . 
The latter corresponds to a “loose” spending limit—in which only unfavored HC -projects 
are not undertaken—and can be attained by taking μ and Cˆ so that  
(11)    ˆu B C Cα μ= + . 
 Notice that if we take ˆL LC C=  (which is justifiable, as argued above) then at the 
optimum 
    0,u L LB C Cα μ− − ≥  
so that 
(12)    u L
L
B C
C
α μ− ≥ . 
Hence, if the tight limit is optimal, (10) and (12) imply that 
    ˆu Lf
L
B CB C C
C
αα −≤ + . 
This means that if f L uC Cα α< , we may choose Cˆ  either bigger or smaller than C  and 
still satisfy all the conditions for optimality.  From (11) and (12), the same is true a 
fortiori if the loose limit is optimal. 
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 The loose limit is optimal if and only if favored HC -projects and unfavored C -
projects are together socially desirable on net, i.e., if 
(13)   ( ) ( ) ( )( )( )1 1 1 0Hx f B C x f B Cρ− − + − − − > . 
Summarizing, we have: 
Proposition 1: Given the official’s preferences and a cashless contractor, second-best 
social welfare can be maximized using a linear public accounting system with spending 
limit G in which (i) LC -projects are always undertaken; (ii) the accounting cost of a LC -
project is set equal to its true cost LC ; (iii) if f L uC Cα α< , the accounting cost of a C -
project is set either above or below its true cost C ; (iv) the optimal budget constraint is 
loose (i.e., admits all C -projects and favored HC -projects) rather than tight (i.e., admits 
only favored C -projects) if and only if (13) holds. 
Remark: From (13), a loose budget constraint is optimal provided that the probability of 
ex ante knowledge about costs is small enough (x is low) or the proportion of favored 
groups is small enough (f is low). 
4 Private Finance 
We now introduce intermediated finance in a highly stylized fashion.  Assume 
that, at cost 0m ≥ , a financial intermediary, not just the public official, can pre-evaluate a 
project together with the project’s contractor, and thereby learn the date-2 cost ex ante 
with probability x (the case 0m =  corresponds to the framework of section 3).  Backed 
by such a private financier, a contractor has financial muscle and so can accept a fixed-
price contract even for C -projects.  
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 Let us assume that m is sufficiently low so that pre-evaluation is socially 
worthwhile, i.e., the expected benefit of weeding out a favored HC -project outweighs the 
cost: 
     ( ) ( )1 .Hm x f C Bρ< − − 17 
We suppose that the intermediary captures enough of this surplus so that pre-evaluation is 
also privately worthwhile.  With pre-evaluation, all contracts will be of the fixed-price 
variety, and social welfare becomes: 
    ( ) ( )( )1Lx B C x B C mρ − + − − − . 
 Four points follow: 
(a) There is no social benefit from privately financing LC -projects.  (But, of course, they 
are not known to be LC  projects until they are monitored.) 
(b) The benefit of intermediated finance exhibited here differs from those typically 
emphasized in the corporate finance literature.18  In our framework, the contractor faces 
no internal incentive problem, and so intermediated finance does not—unlike in standard 
models—serve to reduce production costs.  Instead, its role is to constrain the public 
official by certifying a project’s cost to public accountants (or to the courts).  As noted in 
the introduction, it enables the securitization of public sector liabilities and thereby 
provides a clearer picture of public sector performance. 
(c) Private finance is associated with a higher frequency of fixed-price contracts. 
                                                 
17 This formula assumes that the “loose” limit above is optimal in the absence of private finance. 
18 Summarized, for instance, in chapter 9 of Tirole (2006). 
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(d) We cannot conclude that private finance leads to greater public investment.  But, of 
course, it does enhance public investment if the optimal policy in the model of section 3 
is a tight spending limit. 
 To summarize, we have: 
Proposition 2: Through pre-evaluation, private financiers certify the cost of a project and 
potentially raise welfare by preventing HC -projects from being undertaken. Private 
finance induces a higher incidence of fixed-price contracts. 
5 Unbundling 
 We have assumed so far that the public official enters into long-term (two-period) 
contracts with contractors and have labeled such arrangements “public-private 
partnerships.”  To assess the value of PPPs, let us contrast them with arrangements in 
which development and operations are “unbundled.”  In the unbundled scenario, each 
project has two contractors: one at date 1, and one at date 2.  Because date 1 costs always 
equal 1I , any date-1 contract involves payment 1 1t I=  to the date-1 contractor. Thus, the 
spending constraint becomes 
     ˆyC G< , 
where y is the proportion of all potential projects that are undertaken and Cˆ  is the 
accounting cost (which now must be the same for all projects regardless of the actual 
total cost).  If, as before, μ denotes the shadow price of the budget constraint, the official 
will undertake group i’s project if and only if 
(14)   { } { }ˆ with , ,  and ,i i i L H i f uB C C C C C Cα μ α α α≥ + ∈ ∈ . 
Comparing (7)-(9) with (14), we obtain 
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Proposition 3: Unbundling prevents early public assessment of projects’ costs and 
therefore (weakly) reduces social welfare. 
 The cost of unbundling in our model differs from the costs emphasized in the 
literature. Here it stems from a misalignment between the official’s and the public’s 
interests, and from the concomitant need to keep the official under the control of an 
informative accounting system.  By contrast, the literature has focused on gaming by the 
contractor, which may derive, for example, from the “moral hazard in teams” situation 
created by unbundling.   
 
6 Time Shifting and Hidden Rents 
 The import of Proposition 3 is that, compared to unbundled contracts, PPPs can 
increase the transparency of public accounts.  However, with this benefit comes a 
potential countervailing danger, namely, that bundling may make hidden intertemporal 
transfers possible.  Specifically, suppose that a PPP contract is designed so that the 
contractor gets a date-2 rent that is invisible to public accountants at date 1.  The 
contractor will then be willing to settle for a contractual payment smaller than its total 
cost, since it knows that it will recoup the shortfall through the subsequent rent.  Notice 
that there is no mechanism to backload payments in this way under unbundled contracts 
and so there, in contrast with PPPs, the date-1 contractor would be unwilling to agree to a 
payment below the investment cost. 
 “Invisible” rents can result from deliberate omission of contractual specifications, 
i.e., from “strategically incomplete” contracts.  For example, the contract may “neglect” 
to specify certain obligations on the part of the contractor that will make renegotiation 
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later on necessary to ensure acceptable service.  Such renegotiation can then create hold-
up rents for the contractor.  Alternatively, the contract may assign the contractor control 
rights whose impact is not reflected in the public accounts.  According to Engel et al 
(2003, page 6), a case in point was a major public highway construction project in 
Argentina in the 1990s: the location of the toll booths was left unspecified, allowing the 
contractor to place them strategically and thereby raise motorists’ costs well above the 
anticipated level. 
 Assume that 1x = , so that fixed-price contracts are always feasible.  Let us 
formalize strategic incompleteness in a simple-minded reduced form: incompleteness 
(which is not publicly observable) creates a date-2 rent H Lr C C= −  for the contractor, 
but reduces the public benefit from B to LB .  Such incompleteness allows the contractor 
to break even on a HC -project when paid only LC .  The public official can then exploit 
the incompleteness to undertake HC -projects for her favored groups in place of LC -
projects for unfavored groups, provided that: 
     f L uB Bα α> . 
Note that such an undesirable substitution is not feasible with unbundled contracts 
because there the date-1 contractor cannot obtain a date-2 rent. 
 An implication of this analysis is that PPP contracts need to be carefully reviewed 
by independent authorities that can expose hidden rent backloading.  Of course, 
introducing such an authority is typically expensive, so that PPPs can be expected to 
entail higher transaction costs than their unbundled counterparts.19 
                                                 
19 Unbundling may save on transaction costs in another way: when the uncertainty about date 2 costs 
resolves, it may be possible to draft simpler (and therefore cheaper) contracts at date 2. 
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Proposition 4: PPP contracts may allow hidden backloading of contractor profits through 
strategic incompleteness of contracts. 
7 Further Research 
 Our analysis in this paper is only a first step and leaves open many questions.  
Here are a few issues for further exploration: 
(1) We have left electoral accountability out of our model in order to focus on accounting 
systems.  But obviously in practice public investment is often strongly motivated by the 
credit that politicians can take for it.  As we have noted, the most straightforward model 
of accountability would not change our conclusions at all.  But more elaborate departures 
(e.g., those described in footnote 16) would be worthwhile exploring. 
(2) Our analysis has focused on “greenfield” projects, and neglects the official’s 
incentives to invest in such projects rather than maintain existing ones.  Such a trade-off 
will depend both on the nature of the accounting system and on the public credit an 
official can derive from each activity.  We might conjecture that politicians would be 
biased against maintenance projects, especially if those projects were initiated by others, 
since performance evaluation would then be subject to a “moral hazard in teams” 
problem. 
(3) We have focused on taxpayer-financed projects.  Although this may be a reasonable 
approximation for environmental and cultural projects (e.g., parks or museums) or 
education, many PPPs in practice are largely user-financed (“self-liquidating”).  In fact, 
the mix of financing by taxpayers and users is ordinarily a policy-choice variable: the 
allocation of the costs for highways, airports, bridges or water-treatment facilities 
between taxpayers and users is subject to considerable discretion.  Of course, this 
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allocation will depend on the same considerations as already mentioned: public sector 
accounting and public officials’ electoral concerns.  Strict accounting rules are likely to 
favor self-liquidating investments.  Yet, just as public accountants may be fooled by a 
public official, so may the beneficiaries of public projects.  The Argentinean highway toll 
booths provide a good example. 
(4) Spending caps can be justified by negative externalities beyond the one considered in 
this paper (the effect of public spending on future taxpayers).  For example, public 
spending may also constrain future governments.  Furthermore, future difficulties in 
repaying public debt can spill over to other states, regions or countries. 
(5) Politicians’ incentives to shift liabilities to the future suggest a complementary role 
for independent agencies.  Such agencies (e.g., the World Bank, the General Accounting 
Office, or the Insitut de Gestion Déléguée in France) can provide ex ante advice on best-
contracting and best-accounting practices and can analyze performance ex post to create 
public pressure for good overall governance.20 
(6) Public accounting is more complicated than the process of simply labeling projects as 
“high-cost” or “low-cost.”  For example, governments often try to shift liabilities (e.g., 
unfunded pensions and future bank bailouts) off the public sector’s balance sheet 
altogether.  Despite the extensive discussions on fiscal constitutions throughout the world 
and a voluminous policy literature on constitutional design, there is essentially no 
analytic analysis of this important issue. 
                                                 
20 In the same way that the Congressional Budget Office in the United States estimates the future budgetary 
impact of legislation, agencies can help warn public accountants and users about the likely impact of PPPs. 
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